Is the Algerian regime breathing its last breaths under the rubble of its successive crises?!
The Algerian regime is currently experiencing one of its most difficult periods since its formal independence from France. Crises are looming from every direction, and no sooner has the regime put one crisis aside than it begins to grapple with the consequences of another. Contributing to the aggravation of this reality are a host of internal factors, rooted in the structure of the regime itself and the imbalances that have accumulated over the past decades, as well as objective factors related to international and regional actors with whom the regime has failed to manage its relationship throughout its entire history.
Thus, a mere glance at the most prominent crises experienced by the regime controlling the "new Algeria" under the leadership of the Chengriha-Tebboune duo, specifically after the end of the popular movement and the emergence from the COVID-19 crisis, reveals a long list of successive crises, truly impossible to enumerate, without any notable real achievements. On the regional level, one can address the crisis of severing relations with Morocco and the closure of Algerian airspace to Moroccan flights; the crisis of poor relations with Libyan General Khalifa Haftar, who controls his country's border with Algeria; the inability to include Mauritania within the Algerian orbit by joining the distorted Arab Maghreb Union formed by Tebboune and Kais Saied, and its refusal (that is, Mauritania) to sacrifice its relations with Morocco, especially after the assassination attempt on President Ghazouani in Algeria; and most recently, the regime's crisis with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, following the Algerian army's downing of a Malian drone within the latter's borders. If we expand the circle further, we find an unrelenting crisis with the United Arab Emirates, as well as with the rest of the Gulf states, with none of which Algeria has succeeded in marketing its anti-Moroccan territorial integrity logic. Finally, there is the crisis of support for the deposed regime of Bashar al-Assad, exposed by the Syrian forces' arrest of dozens of Algerian soldiers and officers, as well as Polisario mercenaries who were fighting the rebels alongside Assad. As for the regime's international relations, they represent a series of endless crises with Russia, France, Spain, the United States, Turkey, and others, for two reasons and no third: the conflicting orders received by the generals of this functional regime from Russia, France, and the United States, and the Algerian regime's inability to accept the shifting positions of these countries in favor of supporting the Moroccan Sahara. Perhaps the most prominent manifestation of the regime's resounding failure on the international stage is its crushing defeat in winning the bet that the regime itself had made evidence of the "striking power of the new Algeria." We mean by this the file of joining the BRICS group, which ended in a shameful defeat despite the massive propaganda deployed by President Tebboune and his media to make this dream a reality for Algerians, before they witnessed with their own eyes its transformation into a nightmare!
We cite these external crises without addressing the dozens of internal crises resulting from the failure of the various governments that have succeeded in the era of the new Algeria to improve any aspect of Algerians' lives, whether in terms of ending queues for basic goods, or in terms of freedoms and emptying prisons of Hirak detainees, or in terms of reducing the number of those throwing themselves into the death boats, and many others. Indeed, the regime's inability over the past five years to accomplish the simple task of purchasing—or even renting—firefighting planes to spare Algeria's forests and the inhabitants of its mountainous regions from the flames that rage every summer, especially in the Kabylie region, is evidence of this failed military regime's inability to succeed in any internal or external mission!
ورغم سلسلة الهزائم هذه، فإن الرئيس تبون أثبت بأنه لا يملك ذرة واحدة من الخجل تجعله يتحفظ على تكرار وعوده الكاذبة للجزائريين، حتى مع إدراك كل جزائري منكوب بحكم هذا النظام، بأنه لم يحقق أي وعد من تلك التي قطعها في الحملتين الانتخابيتين الرئاسيتين اللتين خاضهما، ولا في اللقاءات الإعلامية الدورية التي يطبل لها إعلامه بصفاقة منقطعة النظير! ولعل خرجته الأخيرة في حضرة رجال الأعمال، وإصراره المثير للسخرية بأن بلاده ستصبح القوة الاقتصادية الأولى في أفريقيا، بدخل قومي يتجاوز 400 مليار دولار، يقترب من ضعف دخلها المعلن حاليا، وذلك خلال عامين ونصف (قبل نهاية 2027)، علما بأن اقتصاده ينمو بوتيرة تدور حول 4 بالمئة، وليس 40% أو 400%!! والأدهى من كل ما سبق، أن الرئيس تبون الذي يعتمد اقتصاده على الصادرات النفطية بنسبة تتجاوز %90، تحدث بهذه الثقة وهو يشهد تدهور أسعار الطاقة بسبب الحرب التجارية المستعرة بين الولايات المتحدة والصين، وكان يمكن لأي من مستشاريه الاقتصاديين (إن كانوا مطلعين على ما يدور خارج حدودهم) أن يهمس في أذنه بأن أسعار النفط ليست مرشحة لتجاوز سقف ال 60 دولارا للبرميل خلال ما تبقى من العام، وربما حتى الموعد الذي ضربه تبون لتحقيق وعده (نهاية 2027)، بل إن احتمال انهيارها إلى ما دون 40 أو 30 دولارا للبرميل هو احتمال قائم، فماذا سيقول الرئيس الجزائري ساعتها؟!
What can be called the "blindness" of the regime's generals is their disregard for the fact that reducing the number of people standing in line by providing them with the basic goods they need is not enough alone to certify that they have "crossed the river and dried their feet"!! To quote the Moroccan proverb. Because Algerians' need for freedom and dignity, and for those charged with managing their public affairs to be held accountable, is no less than their need for bread. Moreover, putting an end to the "wars of the generals," which have directly resulted in the flight of many of them and the imprisonment of dozens of others, is essential for the continuation of the military regime itself and halting its internal erosion.
The regime's expected loss of support from its strategic ally, France, with whom news of the deterioration of relations has become a daily occurrence, is no longer confined to closed rooms. This coincides with its inability to win over its primary arms supplier, Russia, due to the exaggerated fear of an angry reaction from the Trump administration, and China's indifference to providing any kind of lifeline to this "expired" regime. Not to mention the tension in its relationship with smaller international players such as Turkey, despite its constant promotion of its strong relations with them. All of these factors indicate that this regime, which has been accustomed since its founding to living under the protection of a major power, has begun to feel that it is being left out in the open without any shelter. This feeling will hasten its end if Algerians realize this reality, and that their battle with their corrupt regime is not taking place in the presence of any advantage for it, and that it is truly living in its weakest state!!
In conclusion, with Algerians certain that they are living under a failed system with no hope of achieving any notable successes like those promoted by their president, this will be a sign of the renewal of the movement. However, the fundamental difference between it and its first round in 2019 is that this time it will not stop before sweeping away the system in all its details. This is not only because they learned from the lesson of its first aborted abort, but also because the system in its current state (under the leadership of General Chengriha) is immeasurably weaker than its state under the leadership of General Gaid Salah. The coming days hold certainty!!
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